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With the use of comparable data from seven West African capitals, we attempt to assess the 
rationale behind development policies targeting high rates of school enrolment through the 
prism of allocation of labour and returns to skills across the formal and informal sectors. We 
find that people with high levels of education allocate to the small formal sector and receive 
high compensation for their education and experience. Less educated workers allocate to the 
informal sector. While self-employment reveals some characteristics of a sector of dynamic 
entrepreneurship, the characteristics of the informal salaried sector are closer to those of a 
sector of hidden unemployment, or a stepping stone for better jobs in the future. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Educational investment in general and investment in basic education in particular 
have long been among the main targets of both bilateral and multilateral donors. Between 
the 1960s and the turn of the 21
st century, the World Bank, the single largest donor, 
doubled  its  total  investment,  while  the  eight  largest  bilateral  donors  reached  a 
contribution of more than USD 100 million per annum (EFA Global Monitoring Report, 
2005).  As  Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  consistently  been  the  primary  destination  of 
educational investment, it is not surprising that gross elementary school enrolment rates 
in the sub-continent increased from 40% in the 1960s to 87% in the 1990s, while gross 
secondary school enrolment rates rose from 3.4% to 26% over the same period (World 
Bank,  2004).  Yet,  the  number  of  adults  without  basic  literacy  increased  from  131.4 
million in 1990 to 136 million in 2000, more than one in 10 children continued to repeat 
at  least  one  grade  in  more  than  half  of  the  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  and  the 
expected link between increasing levels of educational enrolment and growth remains as 
elusive as ever (UNESCO, 2007; Pritchett, 2001).  
A plausible, but often ignored, explanation of the above pattern could be the low 
usability of the available stock of education or barriers to its productive utilization in the 
Sub-Saharan  African  labour  market,  which  decrease  both  the  individual  incentive  to 
acquire education and the association between educational enrolment and growth. The 
two strands of literature touching upon this issue have failed to reach a consensus. On the 
one hand, there has been an ongoing debate on the appropriate measurement of returns to   3 
different types of education. Some authors find a convex relationship between education 
and earnings (Schultz, 2004; Söderbom et al., 2006; Kuepie et al., 2006), while others 
assume this relationship to be concave (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). At least part 
of the inability to reconcile these findings - with clearly conflicting policy implications - 
comes  from  empirical  shortcomings  related  to  concordance  of  data  sampling  and 
econometric techniques across different countries, as well as inadequate accounting for 
unobserved characteristics in estimates of returns to observed skills (Bennell, 1996).  
On  the  other hand, research on the  allocation of  skills  across  different  labour 
market  niches  has  established  that  following  the  structural  reform  of  the  1980s,  the 
formal urban sector across Sub-Saharan Africa shrank, while allocation of people into the 
informal sector and not working rose (Rama, 1998; Calvès and Schoumaker, 2004). In 
several countries, this process coincided with the rising inflow of highly educated people 
into the pools of informal, unemployed and discouraged labourers (Serneels, 2004; World 
Bank, 2006).  
However, there is no answer to the question of whether this pattern prevails across 
African  countries  and  if  so,  whether  the  primary  culprit  is  low  “mastery”  level  of 
observed  skills,  i.e.  low  level  of  usability  of  skills  in  the  changing  environment,  as 
opposed to a shortage of productive job opportunities that puts barriers to their effective 
utilization (World Bank, 2006). The ambiguity is further aggravated by the fact that more 
than half of the workers in these countries are not protected by labour legislation and 
work  in  small,  informal  enterprises.  At  the  same  time,  the  literature  addressing  the 
functioning of the informal sector in developing countries has failed to adequately resolve 
the debate between market dualism, which looks at the informal sector as a disadvantaged   4 
sector and sector of exploitation of underprivileged workers (Mazumdar, 1983; Fields, 
1990) as opposed to a sector of personal choice or dynamic entrepreneurship that shows 
few of the characteristics of a stylised dual economy (Maloney, 1999; 2004).  
The  primary  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  find  out  whether  there  is  efficient 
allocation of human capital in the urban West African labour markets, and if not, whether 
the  primary  culprit  is  an  inadequate  usability  of  skills  required  or  the  absence  of 
appropriate productive opportunities for the effective use of these skills. With the use of a 
sophisticated econometric technique, we first explore the determinants of the allocation 
of labour across the formal sector, different modalities of the informal sector and not 
working  in  the  West  African  urban  markets.  To  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first 
comparative investigation of the allocation of labour in the informal sector of several 
African countries based on surveys using identical sampling plans and questionnaires. 
The pattern of resource allocation established in the first stage, useful as it is in 
telling us where people with different levels of education  go, tells us little about the 
usability of resources and their possible misallocation in the labour market. Indeed, both 
the allocation of people with high and low levels of education out of working and in the 
informal sector may be a reflection of an efficiently functioning labour market and high 
levels of mastery of skills. For instance, the allocation of highly educated people out of 
the labour force may be a reflection of low mastery of skills and skill obsolescence while 
the allocation of highly educated people into the informal sector could be consistent with 
the development of productive niches in the informal sector. This scenario can equally be 
consistent  with  high  institutional  barriers  to  formal  employment  which  precludes  the 
allocation of people with high levels of observed and unobserved skills into the small   5 
formal  sector,  while  the  informal  sector  is  a  sector  of  hidden  unemployment  which 
absorbs people with high levels of both observed and unobserved skills. At the same 
time, the allocation of people with low levels of education into the informal sector would 
not  necessarily  be  a  reflection  of  low  levels  of  productivity  of  this  sector  in  an 
environment  where  observed  educational  stocks  are  not  an  indicator  of  adequate 
education  quality  and  unobserved  skills  like  entrepreneurship  are  rewarded  in  a 
flourishing informal sector.  
In  the  second  stage  of  our  empirical  exercise,  we  therefore  estimate  earnings 
equations  for  the  different  employment  sectors,  after  controlling  for  the  influence  of 
unobserved skills on the selection of employment sector. Our methodology will not only 
help  us  find  whether  people  are  negatively  selected  in  say  the  informal  sector  (i.e. 
earnings  in  the  informal  sector  are  lower  than  those  of  a  randomly  selected  average 
worker  due  to  the  allocation  of  people  with  better  unobserved  characteristics  in 
alternative labour market niches), we can provide an answer as to whether these people 
would  have  performed  better  in  the  formal  sector,  or  whether  their  unobserved 
characteristics are highly correlated with (hidden) unemployment. If we find a negative 
selectivity of people in the formal sector, this could be an indication of high levels of 
nepotism or barriers to  formal sector employment. If, on the other hand, we  find no 
selectivity problem in the formal sector or a positive selection of people in the formal 
sector together with negative selectivity in the informal sector, this could indicate an 
absence  of  entrepreneurship  or  productive  opportunities  in  the  informal  sector.  High 
quality comparable data across West African countries allow us to draw a fairly general 
picture on the pattern of allocation of labour and returns to skills in the sub-continent.   6 
Our  results  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis  of  efficient  resource 
allocation. People with high levels of education allocate to the formal sector and receive 
high returns to their skills, while people with low levels of education allocate to the 
informal sector. There is no significant evidence of misallocation of resources across the 
formal and informal sectors. The characteristics of the informal self-employment sector 
are not inconsistent with the concept of dynamic entrepreneurship, while the informal 
salaried  sector is more consistent with the perception of hidden unemployment, or at 
least a stepping stone towards better labour market opportunities in the future. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical 
methodology. In section 3 we provide some details on the data used. Section 4 comments 
on the regression results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Methodology 
 
Our basic model is given by:                     
    s s s s U X Y + = β ,                                                        [1] 
and    
    ,
*
s s s s Z Y η γ + =         , ... 1 M s =                                  [2]                  
                          
where  s Y  refers to the earnings associated with a specific sector,  
*
s Y  is a discrete choice 
variable indicating the sector of employment,  s X  and  s Z  are demographic and other 
explanatory variables  and the disturbance  s U  satisfies E( s U |  X ) = 0 and V ( s U |  Z X, )   7 
= σs
2. When using OLS, the earnings equations are run separately. However, if there are 
unobserved characteristics of individuals that affect both their choice of employment and 
their earnings, the error terms  s U  and  s η  will be correlated and the OLS estimates of 
s β will be inconsistent.  
To  correct  for  the  potential  inconsistency,  applied  research  has  traditionally 
employed  the  bias  correction  method  embedded  in  Lee’s  (1983)  extension  of  the 
Heckman  (1979)  two-stage  selection  model  to  the  multinomial  logit  case.  The  exact 
equivalent  of  the  Heckman  inverse-Mill’s  ratio  in  each  sectoral  earnings  equation  is 
based on the correlation between the disturbance term of each wage equation and the 
cumulative distribution of  s ε , where  ) ( max
*
s j s j s y η ε − =
≠
. The joint distribution of  s U and 
s ε   depends  on  all  j j Z γ   and  the  related  bias  correction  term  incorporates  all  the 
information  from  the  multinomial  logit  model.  Its  sign  indicates  the  direction  of  the 
selection  bias  resulting  from  the  selection  of  individuals  in  the  sector  for  which  an 
earnings equation is estimated as opposed to all other sectors taken together. 
Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2007, hereafter BFG) argue that clubbing 
together  all  information  based  on  the  multinomial  logit  model  makes  the  selectivity 
correction mechanism unnecessarily restrictive. They offer an alternative, which takes 
into account the correlation between the disturbance terms from each earnings equation 
and the disturbance terms from each multinomial logit equation (namely  s U  and  s η ). 
This link is incorporated in their model by assuming a linear association between  s U and 
s η ,  i s s s i i U ω η ρ σ + = ∑
* ,  for  each  i,  i.e.,  a  latent  equation.    Hence,  the  conditional 
expected  value  of  the  disturbances  from  the  latent  equation  is    8 
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> = > ∑ η ρ σ .  After  substituting  this  conditional 
expected value into the earnings equation and performing several algebraic manipulations 
in the spirit of Lee, we are left with the following bias-corrected earnings equation:  
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P m X Y ,                                    [3] 
where  Ps  is  the  probability  that  a  category  s  is  chosen,  v1=η1+logP1  and 
∫ − = dv v g Ps v J Ps m ) ( ) log ( ) ( . The number of bias correction terms in this equation is 
equal to the number of multinomial logit choices.  
The BFG methodology thus allows us to identify not only the direction of the bias 
related to the allocation of individuals in a specific sector, but also which choice among 
any two alternative sectors this bias stems from. For instance, a positive bias correction 
coefficient  related  to  selection  equation  3  in  earnings  equation  1  highlights  higher 
earnings of individuals in sector 1 compared to individuals taken at random, due to the 
allocation of people with worse unobserved skills out of sector 1 into sector 3.  
  The BFG model is appealing. Monte Carlo experiments show that while the Lee 
(1983) model performs well only in relatively small samples, the BFG method tends to be 
the universally preferred econometric methodology for selectivity correction based on the 
multinomial logit, even when flexible (e.g., non-linear) specifications are present and the 
IIA condition does not hold.
1 
                                                 
1 For an overview of all known methods for selectivity correction based on the multinomial logit, and 
justification for the universally preferable qualities of the BFG method, see Bourguignon et al. (2007). 
Further examples of the use of the BFG methodology in empirical research and discussion of its advantages 
over all alternative selectivity correction models based on multiple choices can be found in Dimova and 
Gang (2007), Smith et al. (2004) and Ewoudou and Vencatachellum (2006).   9 
Given the fact that the satisfaction of the IIA condition is often a numerically 
difficult  task,  driven  by  the  tolerance  levels  used,  we  perform  and  first  report  the 
marginal effects from a multinomial probit analysis of sectoral choice. We then report the 
results  from  our  BFG  estimations,  after  correcting  for  potential  biases  in  earnings 
determination.  Note that while the second stage estimates from BFG are consistent, they 
have inefficient standard errors due to the two-step nature of the procedure. We obtain 
efficient standard errors with the use of bootstrapping.   
            
3. Data 
3.1. The 1-2-3 surveys 
Our empirical analysis uses data from urban household surveys in West Africa (the 1-2-3 
Surveys),  conducted  in  seven  major  Western  African Economic  and  Monetary  Union 
(WAEMU)  capitals  –  Abidjan,  Bamako,  Cotonou,  Dakar,  Lomé,  Niamey  and 
Ouagadougou  –  between  2001  and  2002
2.  They  were  carried  out  by  the  countries’ 
National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL as part of the PARSTAT Project, 
the regional statistical assistance project for multilateral monitoring, sponsored by the 
WAEMU Commission. The project consists of three different phases, collecting three 
different sets of data: (1) individual socio-demographic and labour market characteristics, 
(2) firm level informal sector characteristics, and (3) household level consumption and 
living conditions. Our study is based on data from phase one. To assure consistency with 
the labour economics literature, we restrict our samples to include only individuals in the 
formally recognised working age group of 15-65. To avoid getting a wrong impression 
                                                 
2 The survey was not carried out in Guinea-Bissau.   10 
about the pool of not-working people we exclude those that are currently undergoing 
education. 
  The  survey  methodology  is  aimed  at  assuring  high  quality,  high  degree  of 
representativeness  and  comparability  across  countries.  It  includes  data  from  2,500 
households in each of the seven cities, with the exception of Abidjan where the number 
of  households  is  3,000.  Overall  17,841  households  answered  the  questionnaire.  This 
corresponds to 93,213 individuals, 69,565 of whom are over the age of 10. Details on the 
actual data collection can be found in Brilleau, Roubaud and Torelli (2005), Brilleau, 
Ouedraogo and Roubaud (2005) and Kuepie et al. (2006).  
  The  data  allows  us  to  distinguish  between  people  holding  different  types  of 
employment.  Our  categorization  is  based  on  the  sector  of  employment  for  the 
individual’s main job.  
The  definition  of  our  two  informal  sector  categories  is  based  on  the  ILO 
standards, described in Maloney (1999, 2004). Specifically, an informal self-employed 
worker is somebody  who owns  an individual business that is not  formally  registered 
according to the national regulations. An informal salaried worker, on the other hand, is a 
person employed by an informal firm. The employment of this worker is not regulated by 
a labour contract, formal pay-slips and social security benefits. The qualitative distinction 
between these two categories is a priori unclear. It is plausible to assume that the informal 
self-employment sector in the context of high regulatory barriers develops as a sector of 
dynamic entrepreneurship, while the informal salaried sector absorbs workers unable to 
sustain employment in the formal salaried sector. It is equally plausible to assume that in   11 
a dualistic market, both sectors develop as inferior sectors of hidden unemployment, with 
no obvious qualitative difference between them. 
Our formal sector category includes people who are either employed by formal 
institutions  and  firms  (including  public  administration)  or  work  for  an  officially 
registered business as independent workers. The latter of these formal categories includes 
less  than  1%  of  the  workers  in  our  samples,  typically  including  professions  such  as 
doctors or lawyers. The small size of this sample makes it impossible for us to explore it 
as a sector of its own.  
One of the most difficult tasks in our study is the appropriate measurement of 
earnings. This is due to the fact that workers in the informal sector do not have formal 
pay slips and are not obliged to disclose their incomes. To overcome these difficulties, 
the  interviewers  were  asked  to  help  the  respondents  reconstruct  their  earnings  by 
recapping their monetary inflows and outflows over the reference period. People who 
were not able or were unwilling to disclose their exact earnings were asked to give a 
bracket, defined as a multiple of the minimum wage in the labour force. Nearly half of 
the employed workers (48%) declared a precise income figure and over one third (36%) 
gave a bracket
3. Less than 6% provided no information. For both workers who refused to 
disclose  their  earnings  and  those  who  gave  a  bracket,  earnings  were  imputed  by  an 
econometric estimation based on an income equation
4. We use earnings per hour as a 
                                                 
3 Seven brackets were defined by multiples of the minimum wage in force, providing therefore quite thin 
intervals. 
4 In a first step, an earnings model is estimated for the employed workers who disclosed their precise 
earnings based on their observed characteristics. In a second step, the predicted values from this model are 
imputed. For the individuals with income brackets (which hence constitute the overwhelming proportion of 
workers  with  imputed  incomes),  the  procedure  of  imputation  includes  a  third  step:  uniform  random 
sampling is conducted and the results of this sampling is added to the estimated income until the sum 
obtained comes within the bracket declared by the interviewee. Sensitivity tests of this methodology over   12 
dependent  variable  in  our  earnings  regressions.  Incomes  are  synchronized  across  the 
different capitals with the use of purchasing power parity indexes.  
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics of the samples 
Figures 1 and 2 highlight some preliminary statistics on the allocation of labour and 
educational distribution across the different capitals. Figure 1 indicates that in virtually 
all capitals, the proportion of working age people with no education accounts for 
approximately 50-60% of the samples. It is followed by the proportion of people with 
completed primary education, while education higher than the basic level is a scarce 
commodity. Figure 2 highlights that the majority of working age people either do not 
have permanent employment or work in the informal sector. The formal sector, on the 
other hand, employs at most 15% of the working age populations in these economies.  
Figure 1. Distribution of education across the West African 
cities
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alternative techniques have been conducted in Kuepie et al. (2006) and show that estimates of the earnings 
equations are only marginally modified and remain qualitatively unchanged.  
   13 
Figure 2. Allocation of labour across the formal and informal sectors  
in the West African cities 
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Source: 1-2-3 surveys, Phase 1, 2001-2002 (National Institutes of Statistics, 
AFRISTAT, DIAL); Authors’ calculations. 
 
Some additional descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 1a and 1b. The statistics 
indicate that in all countries formal sector earnings exceed informal sector earnings and 
there is no significant difference between earnings in the informal self-employment and 
the informal salaried sectors. 
  We  define six  different  categorical  education  variables which  help  us identify 
differences  in  returns  to  specific  types  of  education  (e.g.  vocational  versus  general 
training). These differences are difficult to explore with the use of a continuous education 
variable. Unfortunately, high levels of school drop-out in the African context decreases 
the  rationale  for  defining  these  variables  along  the  lines  of  completed  degrees  of 
education. We therefore define the following education variables. Education_1 includes 
people  with  complete  primary  school  or  incomplete  middle  school  education. 
Education_2  includes  individuals  with  secondary  vocational  training.  Education_3 
includes  people  with  complete  middle  school  and  incomplete  secondary  education.   14 
Education_4 includes individuals with complete secondary education and Education_5 
includes people with education higher than the secondary level. The omitted category 
includes people with no education or incomplete primary education.  
  Our  descriptive  statistics indicate  that  while there  is  a  slightly non-linear  link 
between educational attainment and formal sector employment in that in most countries 
the proportion of people with complete primary education exceeds that of people with 
vocational  training  or  people  with  complete  secondary  education,  while  people  with 
tertiary education are in general more likely to be allocated to the formal sector than 
either not work or be in the informal sector. Interestingly, the proportion of non-working 
people with all types of education higher than the omitted category is slightly higher than  
the proportion of such people allocated to the informal sector.  
Female labourers are more likely to either not work or work for the informal self-
employment sector than male labourers. The higher levels of non-employment and lower 
levels of formal employment among women are consistent with gender discrimination 
patterns around the world, while the higher levels of informal self-employment perhaps 
indicate a higher willingness of women to opt for second best jobs in that sector more as 
a complement to family income than in pursuing a career track (Hundley, 2000).  
In our empirical analysis we follow a version of the classical Mincer-type of wage 
equation, which includes education variables, potential experience variable, defined as 
age minus years of education minus 6 (the age at school entry), and a female dummy 
variable. However, it is much more difficult to find exogenous determinants of sector 
choice correlated with the sector, but uncorrelated with the error terms of the earnings 
equation.    15 
In  keeping  with  the  literature,  we  give  preference  to  parental  occupation 
categories  as  an  excluding  condition  in  our  two  stage  analysis  (Evans  and  Leighton, 
1989; Earle and Sakova, 2000). Specifically, we define a dummy variable taking the 
value  of  one  if  the  respondent’s  father  was  an  informal  sector  employee  during  the 
respondent’s childhood, and a dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondent’s 
father was a formal sector employee
5. The omitted category is a father who did not have 
permanent employment during the respondent’s childhood. We find that, as expected, the 
children  of  informal  sector  workers  are  more  likely  to  work  for  the  informal  sector 
themselves, but the link between the occupation of the father and formal employment of 
the child is not as straightforward.  
 
4.  Specification and Econometrical Results 
   
Following our preceding discussion, our empirical specification is:  
 
           Sector = β0 + β1Experience + β2Experience squared + Σ β 3i Education + β4Female  
 + β6Dad Formal+ β7 Dad Informal + υ                                                 [4] 
 
            Ln Hourly Earnings = α0 + Σ α1i Education + α2Experience+ α3Experience  
                                                 squared  + α4 Female + u                                               [5] 
where [4] is the selection equation and [5] is the earnings equation. 
 
                                                 
5 Note that due to its distributional properties, the model is identified even without excluding conditions 
(Bourguignon et al, 2007). Indeed, omitting the excluded variables from the first stage equation does not 
change our results.   16 
  Our results are reported in Tables 2-8. Tables 2-5 report the marginal effects from 
our  multinomial  probit  analysis  of  sectoral  choice,  separately  for  the  formal  sector, 
informal self-employment sector, informal salaried sector and not working. Tables 6-8 
highlight the results from our earnings equations with the use of the BFG methodology, 
with each of these tables highlighting the results from our earnings estimations for the 
formal sector, informal self-employment sector and informal salaried sector, respectively. 
 
4.1. Multinomial probit results 
By  and  large, the  marginal effects  from  our  multinomial  probit  analysis  confirm  our 
assumptions from the analytical framework and descriptive statistics. The formal sector 
results, reported in Table 2, indicate that higher education increases the probability of 
working for the formal sector. In all the seven capitals, the positive marginal effect of the 
tertiary education variable (Education_5), in the range of 0.51-0.78 exceeds the positive 
marginal  effects  of  all  education  variables  higher  than  the  omitted  category  of  no 
education or incomplete primary education. Furthermore, we see that in the majority of 
the cities the marginal effect of vocational education (Education_2) is higher than those 
of the general secondary schooling variables. 
  We also observe that potential experience has the expected concave influence on 
working for the formal sector, and female labourers in general face a lower probability of 
working for the formal sector than male workers. Finally, respondents whose fathers had 
consistent employment during their childhoods face a higher probability of working for 
the formal sector and that probability is typically higher for respondents whose fathers 
worked for the formal sector.    17 
  The marginal effects on allocation into the informal sector, reported in Tables 3 
and 4, respectively, reveal a strikingly different pattern. Higher levels of education have a 
negative impact on choosing either the informal self-employment sector or the informal 
salaried sector. However, the negative marginal effects of education are typically higher 
in the informal self-employment equations. This confirms our descriptive statistics results 
whereby the more educated labourers allocate to the formal sector and the least educated 
labourers allocate to the informal sector. Once again the link between experience and 
employment  is  concave  in  the  informal  self-employment  equation  indicating  a  lower 
probability  of  working  for  that  sector  with  the  increase  in  age,  but  the  experience-
employment relationship in the informal salaried equations is convex. This explanation is 
consistent with the Maloney (1999) finding that the informal salaried sector is a stepping 
stone for other types of employment in the future.   
Female  workers  face  a  lower  probability  of  working for  the  informal salaried 
sector  than  male  workers,  a  pattern  consistent  with  that  observed  in  our  descriptive 
statistics.  However,  there  are  some  gender  differences  in  informal  self-employment 
across  the  different  countries  with  women  in  Cotonou  and  Lomé  facing  a  higher 
probability  of  working  for  the  informal  self-employment  sector,  women  in  Abidjan, 
Niamey and Dakar facing a lower probability than males of working for that sector and 
women in Ouagadougou and Bamako facing the same probabilities as males of allocating 
to the informal self-employment sector. These patterns perhaps reflect ethnic differences 
across the different countries
6. Finally, the children of informal sector workers typically 
                                                 
6 For ethnic and gender issues using this data, see Nordman, Robilliard and Roubaud (2008), “Ethnic and 
Gender Wage Gaps in Seven West African Cities”, mimeo DIAL, Paris.    18 
face a higher probability of working for the informal sector and children of formal sector 
workers typically face a lower probability of working for the informal salaried sector. 
The  pattern  of  resource  allocation  into  not  working  is  consistent  with 
conventional wisdom (Table 5). Higher levels of education have a negative impact on the 
probability  of  not  working,  the  experience-not  working  relationship  is  convex,  and 
females face a higher probability of not working than males. Interestingly, the probability 
of  not  working  is  lower  among  the  children  of  informal  sector  employees.  This 
observation  is  consistent  with  the  high  level  of  inter-generational  transmission  of 
employment  status  and  the  shrinking  formal  sector  in  the  aftermath  of  the  structural 
reform. 
 
4.2. Earnings estimations 
We now turn to the estimation of our earnings equations, after accounting for the self-
selection of individuals into the four sectors. The BFG estimates for the formal sector for 
each of the seven capitals are reported in Table 6. The estimates for the informal self-
employment sector are shown in Table 7, and the estimates for the informal salaried 
sector are reported in Table 8.  
  For  each  sector-based  earnings  estimation,  a  negative  (positive)  selectivity 
coefficient related to any of the alternative sectors indicates lower (higher) earnings than 
those of randomly chosen individuals on account of the allocation of individuals with 
better (worse) unobserved characteristics out of the given sector and into the respective 
alternative sector. For instance, if we observe a negative selectivity correction coefficient 
associated with self-employment in the formal sector equation, this indicates lower than   19 
randomly chosen rewards to the skills of individuals working for the formal sector due to 
the  allocation  of  individuals  with  better  unobserved  characteristics  out  of  the  formal 
sector into self-employment.  
The results reported in Table 6 show that in general there is no selection bias in 
the formal sector, with the exception of Ouagadougou and Dakar, where there is negative 
selectivity into formal sector employment, and Lomé, where formal sector earnings are 
negatively biased due to the allocation of people with better unobserved characteristics 
out of the formal sector into the informal salaried sector. 
  The rest of the formal sector earnings estimates are consistent with conventional 
wisdom in that, in general, high levels of education lead to higher earnings. For all but 
one  of  the  capitals  (Lomé)  the  tertiary  education  coefficients  are  positive  and  highly 
significant. The same is true for the rest of the education variables in Cotonou, Abidjan 
and  Niamey,  while  in  Dakar  and  Ouagadougou  only  tertiary  education  provides 
significant  returns  vis-à-vis  the  omitted  category  of  no  education.  In  Bamako,  both 
tertiary  and  completed  general  secondary  education  provide  higher  returns  while,  in 
Togo, there are not significant returns to skills higher than the omitted category. 
  In Cotonou, Bamako and Niamey, there is a positive association between higher 
levels of experience and earnings in the formal sector, the experience-earnings profile in 
Abidjan  is  concave,  and  there  is  no  significant  association  between  experience  and 
earnings  in  Ouagadougou,  Dakar  and  Lomé.  Finally,  the  selectivity  corrected  female 
coefficient is insignificant in all but one of the cities (Abidjan). 
  The association between education and earnings in the informal self-employment 
sector is less straightforward (Table 7). Only in Ouagadougou, Abidjan and Lomé, there   20 
are significant returns to higher levels of education, especially for tertiary education. The 
estimates  for  Cotonou  highlight significantly  higher  returns  to  general  secondary  and 
primary education vis-à-vis the omitted category, while in Niamey and Dakar this is true 
only for primary education. There are no significant returns to any education higher than 
the omitted category in the informal self-employment in Bamako.  
This  configuration  may  reflect  differences  in  the  schooling  dynamics  in  these 
African countries. At one end of the scale, there are the cities with a long tradition of 
schooling. The first group comprises Lomé, Abidjan and Cotonou where, even among the 
individuals  aged  45  to  59,  a  non-negligible  proportion  (at  least  45  percent)  has  the 
minimum  level  of  schooling.  At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum  are  those  where  the 
development of schooling has been stepped up more recently (Bamako, Niamey and, to a 
certain extent, Ouagadougou). In this landscape, Dakar stands out for its stagnation (at 
around 60 percent) in the proportion of individuals without the minimum grounding in 
education across all generations. As far as our results are concerned, Ouagadougou then 
provides the exception with greater returns than those found in similar cities in terms of 
educational dynamics.  
Similarly to results for the formal sector equations, there is significant association 
between  self-employment  earnings  and  experience  only  in  the  case  of  Cotonou  and 
Abidjan, where the relationship between the two variables is concave. Interestingly, in all 
cities, females face lower earnings than males in the informal self-employment sector, 
which is consistent with the perception of females as secondary household earners. 
  The selectivity pattern in the informal self-employment sector differs across the 
cities.  However,  the  most  consistent  finding,  with  five  significant  coefficients  out  of   21 
seven, is that of upward biased earnings due to the allocation of people with inferior 
unobserved  skills  out  of  the  informal  self-employed  sector  into  the  informal  salaried 
sector. Once again this is consistent with the perception of the informal salaried sector as 
a stepping stone to better jobs and as a sector of hidden unemployment.  
  Interestingly, the pattern of returns to skills in the informal salaried sector (Table 
8) is more consistent with the pattern in the formal sector than that in the informal self-
employed sector. In all countries, there are high returns to tertiary education vis-à-vis the 
omitted category, and in general high returns to skills other than tertiary education and 
the  omitted  category.  In  four  out  of  the  seven  cities  there  is  a  concave  earnings-
experience relationship. At the same time, females tend to earn significantly less than 
males everywhere. Finally, there is no significant evidence of selection bias, except in the 
case  of  Cotonou  and  Abidjan  where  earnings  in  the  informal  salaried  sector  are 
downward biased due to the allocation of people with better unobserved skills out of the 
labour force. This finding may reflect the existence of queuing for the formal sector in 
these two countries as returns to participation in the formal sector may far outweigh the 
monetary wage in the salaried informal sector (recall that returns to human capital are 
particularly significant and high in the formal sectors of Cotonou and Abidjan, see Table 
6). Then, the existence of significant rents in the formal sector (especially in the dominant 
public sector) may be so high that it would become perfectly rational for individuals to 
"queue", and discount the returns to be accrued in the informal sector.  
  Overall, we do not observe significant evidence against an efficiently functioning 
labour market. There is no evidence of selection bias in the formal and informal salaried 
sectors, while the positive selection in the informal self-employment sector vis-à-vis the   22 
informal salaried sector can be interpreted as an indication of the allocation of people 
with  lower  entrepreneurial  skills  out  of  self-employment  into  informal  salaried 
employment. There is also a clear differentiation between the formal and informal sector 
in terms of the human capital allocated into these two sectors. Specifically, people with 
higher  education  allocate  to  the  formal  sector,  while  people  with  lower  levels  of 
education allocate in the informal sector.  
 
  5. Concluding remarks 
The  development  of  high  levels  of  human  capital,  and  in  particular,  high  levels  of 
education has long been seen as a panacea for  the developmental problems of lower 
income economies. This perception has found expression in policy making and has led to 
prolific  body  of  academic  literature  on  the  quality  of  education  and  the  success  of 
individual programs in assuring high school enrollment levels. Significantly less attention 
has been attributed to the rentability of the education obtained, and in particular, the 
allocation and adequate use of observed and unobserved skills across formal, informal 
sectors and not  working  in the  labour  markets  of  these  economies.  The  literature  on 
allocation of resources across the different sectors of urban Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
particularly scarce.  
  The main purpose of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature and provide a 
comprehensive  description  of  the  link  between  allocation  of  resources  and  returns  to 
skills across the Western Sub-Saharan African urban labour markets. Specifically, we 
relate the allocation of labour across the formal sector, informal self-employment sector,   23 
informal  salaried  sector  and  not  working  to  the  returns  to  observed  and  unobserved 
characteristics in each of these sectors. 
  Overall, we do not observe very strong evidence against an efficiently functioning 
labour market. There is no evidence of misallocation of resources between  the formal 
and  informal  salaried  sectors,  while  the  positive  selection  in  the  informal  self-
employment  sector  vis-à-vis  the  informal  salaried  sector  can  be  interpreted  as  an 
indication  of  the  allocation  of  people  with  lower  entrepreneurial  skills  out  of  self-
employment  into  informal  salaried  employment.  There  is  also  a  clear  differentiation 
between the formal and informal sector in terms of the human capital allocated into these 
two  sectors.  Specifically,  people  with  higher  education  allocate  to  the  formal  sector, 
while people with lower levels of education allocate in the informal sector.  
  While our results do not provide evidence in favour of misallocation of resources 
in  the  West  African  urban  labor  market  and  are  not  inconsistent  with  those  in  even 
developed  economies,  more  research  is  needed  to  assess  their  broader  economic 
implications. For instance, one needs to probe deeply into the characteristics of both the 
formal and informal sectors, to study their technological structures and to try to answer 
the question as to whether any entrepreneurial capital that may be present in the current 
informal  self-employed  sector  could  be  used  more  productively  in  the  formal  sector 
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Table 1a: Descriptive statistics 


















































































N Obs  907  920  1126  881  981  1377  591 













0.01  (0.12) 
0.08 (0.27) 
0.01  (0.11) 
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0.03  (0.17) 
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N Obs  2688  1943  1913  2270  1570  2225  2260 
Note: the figures in brackets are standard deviations. Education_1 includes people with complete 
primary  school  or  incomplete  middle  school  education.  Education_2  counts  individuals  with 
secondary  vocational  training.  Education_3  includes  people  with  complete  middle  school  and 
incomplete  secondary  education.  Education_4  includes  individuals  with  complete  secondary 
education and Education_5 includes people with education higher than the secondary level. 
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Table 1b: Descriptive statistics 
  Cotonou  Ouagadougou  Abidjan  Bamako  Niamey  Dakar  Lomé 

















































































N Obs  459  744  907  510  561  1100  477 






























0.01  (0.18) 
0.07  (0.25) 
0.02 (0.14) 
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N Obs  1085  2294  1684  1941  3098  4306  969 
Note: the figures in brackets are standard deviations.   29 
Table 2: Determinants of the allocation of people to the formal sector (Marginal effects from multinomial probit model on 
sectoral choice) 
 































































































































































Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The figures in brackets are standard errors. The sample sizes for the 
different country-based multinomial probit models can be inferred from Table 1. The Wald and Log-likelihood tests indicate that the model 
specifications are appropriate. 
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Table 3: Determinants of the allocation of individuals to the informal self-employment sector (Marginal effects from 
multinomial probit model on sectoral choice) 
 
































































































































































Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The figures in brackets are standard errors. The sample sizes for the 
different country-based multinomial probit models can be inferred from Table 1. The Wald and Log-likelihood tests indicate that the model 
specifications are appropriate. 
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Table 4: Determinants of the allocation of individuals to the informal salaried sector (Marginal effects from multinomial 
probit model on sectoral choice) 
 
































































































































































Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The figures in brackets are standard errors. The sample sizes for the 
different country-based multinomial probit models can be inferred from Table 1. The Wald and Log-likelihood tests indicate that the model 
specifications are appropriate. 
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Table 5: Determinants of the allocation of individuals to not working (Marginal effects from multinomial probit model on 
sectoral choice) 
 
































































































































































Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The figures in brackets are standard errors. The sample sizes for the 
different country-based multinomial probit models can be inferred from Table 1. The Wald and Log-likelihood tests indicate that the model 
specifications are appropriate. 
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Table 6: Earnings equation estimates for the formal sector 
 













































































































































































































Adj Rsq  0.3995  0.5384  0.4946  0.3587  0.4682  0.3657  0.3841 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The figures in brackets are bootstrapped standard errors.  
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Table 7: Earnings equation estimates for the informal self-employment sector 
 













































































































































































































Adj Rsq  0.2352  0.2422  0.1655  0.1673  0.1163  0.0918  0.1723 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The figures in brackets are bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Table 8: Earnings equation estimates for the informal salaried sector 
 













































































































































































































Adj Rsq  0.3930  0.4827  0.3310  0.4359  0.3528  0.3003  0.3746 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The figures in brackets are bootstrapped standard errors. 
 
 